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Respondent accepts and incorporates Appellant's statements regarding 
jurisdiction, nature of proceedings, statement of the case, and determinative 
statutes and other ordinances, rules and constitutional provisions. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. WAS THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE AMBIGUOUS AS TO 
ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO ITS ENFORCEMENT AND DID THE COURT BELOW 
PROPERLY EXERCISE ITS EQUITY POWERS TO CORRECT THOSE 
DEFICIENCIES? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent wishes to clarify the facts as stated by Appellant by 
quoting the transcript: 
It is this Court's further observation that the 
Decree of Divorce is deficient and/or ambiguous in 
certain particulars requiring clarification by this 
Court. In an effort to avoid or forestall what 
surely will be future continuing litigation between 
these parties, this Court will now clarify the 
meaning of certain language in the Decree as part 
of the modification process. 
Certainly it is accurate, in my view to state that the 
Decree, insofar as it relates to the equity in the 
home is not clear. It is not, in this Court's view, in 
compliance with the understanding of the parties. 
It is this Court's view therefore, that the meaning 
of the language contained in paragraph six of the 
Decree that the Plaintiff was awarded $15,000 in 
equity in the home to be paid at the earlier of the 
following events: Specifically, the remarriage of 
the Defendant or the selling of the home within 
seven and a half years, or seven and a half years, 
whichever occurs first. 
It is this Court's further observation that the 
Decree of Divorce is likewise deficient and/or 
unclear in the circumstances regarding the payment 
of the retirement benefit owing to the Defendant 
from the Plaintiffs retirement. There is no 
payment date set forth in the Decree. It, in this 
Court's view, would not have been in the parties' 
best interests to require that the Plaintiff pay to the 
Defendant the retirement sums that he is obligated 
to pay from his termination from his employment 
as that would have had a significantly unfavorable 
effect upon the value of that retirement account and 
accordingly, the fact that the Plaintiff has rolled it 
over for tax purposes into an IRA, in this Court's 
view was entirely appropriate. (T. 67-68, 
emphasis added) 
On or about August 4,1988, Respondent's counsel was contacted by 
counsel for Appellant for the purpose of enforcing the judgment of Judge 
Frederick. (See appendix A, letter from Mr. Mohlman to Mr. Fankhauser) 
Respondent did not initiate this action, but nevertheless issued the requested 
deed subject to the lien mentioned in the letter, (see appendix B, quit-claim 
deed as prepared by Appellant and signed by Respondent, and the specific 
reference in paragraph 3 of the same to the court's order of May 23,1988) 
The amount of the lien was equal to Respondent's $15,000 equity in the home 
minus the offset awarded to Appellant, and totaled $6,431,000. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent argues that although the provisions regarding alimony and 
child support, which were not appealed, were clearly modified as per the 
Decree of Divorce, that the court below, rather than executing a modification 
of the Decree instead simply clarified the meaning of certain passages of 
language so that they could be executed equitably. Such clarification was 
necessary because the Decree could not be executed with respect to the equity 
in the home or the retirement funds without such clarification. 
Respondent further argues that the provisions of Acton v. Deliran. 737 
P. 2d 996 (Utah 1987) are inapplicable to the issues raised in this appeal. The 
cases cited in point II of Appellant's brief involved, insofar as they concerned 
the subject of divorce, the execution of an original Decree of Divorce and not 
the modification of an existing decree. 
Respondent argues that the issues presented in this appeal are moot, the 
judgment of the court below having been voluntarily enforced by Appellant. 
This appeal should therefore be dismissed for want of a justiciable issue. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE ARE AMBIGUOUS AS TO 
ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO ITS ENFORCEMENT AND THE COURT BELOW 
PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS EQUITY POWERS TO CORRECT THOSE 
DEFICIENCIES. 
The courts of the State of Utah retain an important and high degree of 
latitude in the exercise of equity powers and the modification of a Decree of 
Divorce. Such was clearly established in both Beckstead v. Beckstead. 663 P. 
2d 47 (Utah 1983) and Mitchell v. Mitchell. 527 P. 2d 1359 (Utah 1974) The 
jurisdiction of the courts in the matter of modification of decrees is 
continuing, and insofar as the exercise of that jurisdiction is based upon a 
material change of circumstances the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable. 
In this sense, the trial court, in modifying a Decree of Divorce can in equity 
exercise the same authority as it could have in the instance of the divorce 
itself. (Mitchell at 1360) There is also as strong presumption of the validity 
of the trial court's determination of the existence of a material and substantial 
change in circumstances which authorized the modification. (Mitchell at 
1360-1361) 
In exercising this broad power in equity, the court can determine the 
most equitable division of the property of parties to a divorce, in keeping 
with an agreement forged by the parties, subject to the court's interpretation 
of the language of the agreement as per the intent of the parties at the time of 
the agreement. (Land v. Land. 605 P. 2d 1248 (Utah 1980) at 1250-1251) 
Following the reasoning of Land, the trial court, upon a determination of the 
ambiguity of a certain passage of a contractual property settlement which is 
incorporated into a Decree of Divorce, can interpret that language in a 
reasonable fashion so as to render it clear and unambiguous. Importantly, a 
trial court is under no obligation to accept a stipulation of parties to a divorce 
concerning a division of marital property, but once it does so, the court "may 
modify such agreement or stipulation at the time of divorce or subsequently". 
(Huckv.Huck. 734 P. 2d 417 (Utah 1986) at 419) 
Having embarked upon a course of unappealed modification, and 
having been moved by the parties to do so, the court below at that time 
attempted to prevent future litigation by clarifying the Decree in question as 
to the time and method of payment of equity in the home ($15,000) by 
Appellant and the payment of equity in the form of retirement funds by 
Respondent. Appellant argues that the language of the Decree with respect to 
the equity interest of Respondent in the home and the time and terms of 
payment thereof was clear and unambiguous. The Decree states: 
6. The Defendant is awarded the parties real 
property located at 356 Isgreen Circle, Tooele, 
Utah, subject to Plaintiffs interest in one half of the 
equity of said residence existing as of the date of the 
divorce herein in the sum of $15,000.00 
conditioned upon the Defendant's selling said 
residence or remarrying within seven and one half 
years of the date of the decree herein Said property 
is located in Tooele City, Tooele County, and [the 
legal description followed] (See copy of the decree 
as contained in Appellant's brief at 'addendum i') 
This paragraph contains a seeming contradiction. It clearly states that 
Respondent was vested with, at the time of the Decree, $15,000 in equity in 
their marital home. The award of the home to Appellant was made "subject 
to Plaintiffs [Respondent's] interest in one half' of it. The Decree does not 
set a time for payment, except that it shall be due and owing when Appellant 
marries or sells the home, within 71/2 years of the date of the Decree. 
Appellant argues that if she neither sells nor marries, at the end of 71/2 years, 
the equity would be divested of Respondent and he would thereafter have no 
interest whatsoever in the home. This is contrary to the testimony of 
Respondent at the hearing for modification. Referring to the equity in the 
home, Respondent was asked by counsel when he believed the equity would 
become due and payable, to which he responded: "After seven and a half 
years." (T. 21) 
Appellant's argument that after 7 1/2 years Respondent's equity would 
terminate poses, if enforced, the following problems: 1) Should Appellant 
remarry, she would be penalized by having to pay off the equity due and 
owing as of that event; 2) Should Appellant sell the home during the 7 1/2 
year period, she would be penalized by having to pay the said equity; 3) 
Should Appellant choose to neither marry nor sell the home, then Respondent 
would be penalized by losing his equity in the home. All of the events 
necessary to trigger the payment or non-payment of the equity were in the 
exclusive control of Appellant. Appellant could, in effect choose to either 
punish herself, or to punish Respondent, using the courts of this state and the 
equity that supposedly vested in Respondent at the time of divorce, as the toll 
of that punishment. The court below, based upon the testimony offered and 
its understanding of the Decree, declined to accept Appellant's arguments, 
and found instead that the language of the Decree was deficient and 
ambiguous. 
Hie conflicting testimony of the parties conceming the meaning of 
paragraph six of the Decree, although only some evidence of an ambiguity 
(see Land at 1251), provides adequate foundation for the Court's finding of 
ambiguity when considered in light of the language of the Decree itself. The 
court properly concluded that it needed to supply certain language in order to 
make the paragraph enforceable by me parties. The court declined to add 
language to the Decree that was in excess of its intent to merely clarify, and 
thus declined to actually modify the Decree as such. For that reason the 
additional language sought by Respondent conceming co-habitation, etc., was 
not added, as it was not mentioned in the original decree. (T. 68) 
The Decree likewise contained no time or terms for the payment of 
Respondent's retirement benefits as per the Decree. The court below, in 
offsetting the amount of retirement due and owing following Respondent's 
termination at Safeway/Farmer Jack was in fact a setting of the time and 
terms of payment. The court in effect said 'now is the time for paying the 
retirement equity, and the method of payment will be this offset. Appellant 
has, therefore received all of the equity due and owing on the retirement of 
Respondent, and the fact that it was an offset against Respondent's equity in 
the home represents a real increase to Appellant equal to the sum offset, in no 
way is at variance with the terms of the Decree and was a proper exercise of 
the equity powers of the court. Appellant seemingly wishes to add to the 
hardships of lost employment and burden Respondent by forcing the payment 
of the retirement benefits in cash thereby incurring a heavy tax liability to be 
paid by Respondent. 
There has been no evidence that the court below abused its discretion, 
which is broad pursuant to its powers of equity, or that the evidence below 
did not support the court's conclusions. Absent such demonstrations, and in 
accordance with the case law already cited, this appeal cannot stand and 
should be dismissed. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S CHOICE TO ENFORCE THE JUDGMENT BELOW THROUGH 
ACQUISITION OF A QUIT-CLAIM DEED AND LIEN, RENDERS THE ISSUES 
RAISED IN ITS BRIEF MOOT. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "moot" as: 
[A] case in which the matter in dispute has already 
been resolved and hence, one [is] not entitled to 
judicial intervention unless the issue is a recurring 
one and likely to be raised again between the 
parties. (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition, 1979 
at 909) 
That definition is supported by Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle. 
416 U.S. 115,94 S. Ct. 1694,40 L. Ed. 2d 1. By electing to enforce the 
judgment below, the issues before the court below, that is the question of the 
meaning of the language in the Decree concerning equity in the home, and the 
time and method of Respondent's surrendering retirement funds, were 
decided. The issues were resolved by the parties following the judgment. To 
hold otherwise allows Appellant to have her cake and eat it too. Appellant 
can enjoy the benefits of added equity to her home, through a reduction of 
Respondent's lien from $15,000 to $6,431. The financial benefits thus 
realized are significant. Thereafter, should this appeal be upheld, appellant is 
in an even better position, whereas if the appeal is dismissed Appellant is in 
no worse position than if the judgment had never been appealed. Again, 
Appellant uses the courts of this state for improper purposes, that is to 
improve her position in this matter, irrespective of the outcome. Appellant 
has elected to enforce the judgment, to enjoy its benefits and must now be 
denied access to this Court, and its powers through appeal. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The court below, rather than executing a modification of the Decree, 
simply clarified the meaning of certain passages of language so that they 
could be executed equitably. Such clarification was necessary because the 
Decree could not be enforced with respect to the equity in the home or the 
retirement funds without such clarification. 
The provisions of Acton v. Deliran. 737 P. 2d 996 (Utah 1987) are 
inapplicable to the issues raised in this appeal. The cases cited in point II of 
Appellant's brief involved, insofar as they concerned the subject of divorce, 
the execution of an original Decree of Divorce and not the modification of an 
existing decree. The level of detail required to set an original amount of 
alimony and child support in findings of fact is much higher than that 
required to establish a change of circumstances or to allow a court to exercise 
it power of equity to modify or clarify a Decree of Divorce. The issues 
raised by the cases Appellant cites in point II of its brief involved the appeal 
of an original Decree of Divorce, not the level of detail necessary to affect a 
modification of a Decree years after the fact. 
The issues presented in this appeal are moot, the judgment of the court 
below having been voluntarily enforced by Appellant. This appeal should 
therefore be dismissed for want of a justiciable issue, and Respondent so 
prays. 
Respectfully submitted this day of December, 1988. 
Ephraim H. Fankhauser 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
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Tooele, Utah 84074, on this day of December, 1988. 
Ephraim H. Fankhauser 
APPENDIX A 
M O H L M A N & Y O U N G 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
FRANK T MOHLMAN 
250 SOUTH MAIN STREET • P O BOX87-TOOELE UTAH 84074 • 801/882-161 8 M DON YOUNG 
August 4, 1988 
E.H. FANKHAUSER 
660 SOUTH 200 EAST - SUITE 100 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
Re: Whitehouse v. Whitehouse 
Dear Mr. Fankhauser: 
Enclosed please find a quitclaim deed which requires your client*s signature. 
As you can see in the body of the deed, I reserved the lien interest in the 
property to your client. 
As you are probably aware, I am intending to file an appeal on the ruling of 
Judge Frederick, and if we are successful on the appeal, I would expect your 
client to issue a new quitclaim deed without the reservation of the lien 
interest. 
Please contact me if you have a different understanding about the case than I 
have indicated. Please forward the deed back to me as soon as possible. 
Very truly yours, 
FRANK T. MOHLMAN 
FTM/rw 
Enclosure 
LT20 
APPENDIX B 
LA! A N * Y O U N G 
TOMKCYR AT U W 
MOnOlTM MAIN 
MYKUC I T AH MOTt 
QUIT-aAIM DEED 
TED S. WHITEHOUSE, c/o E.H. Fankhauser, 660 South 200 East, Suite 
100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, GRANTOR, hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to KATHLEEN S. 
WHITEHOUSE, 356 Isgreen Circle, Tooele, Utah 84074, GRANTEE, for the sum of 
TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration, all of his right, 
title, and interest in the following described real property in Tooele 
County, State of Utah, and any buildings and appurtenances thereunto 
attached: 
Lot 14, Isgreen addition, Tooele City, according to the 
official plat thereof, as recorded in the office of the 
Tooele County Recorder, subject to easements, restrictions, 
and rights-of-way appearing of record or enforceable in law 
or equity. 
This deed is subject to a lien in favor of Grantor in the amount of 
$6,431.00 to be paid when Grantee remarries, the home is sold or seven and 
one-half years from the date of the Decree of Divorce, whichever event first 
occurs. (Civil No. 83-080-Order May 23, 1988) 
Witness the hands of said Grantor this /£ day of /ft/)UST% 1988. 
TET5S. WHITEHOUSE 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Tooele 
) 
( ss 
) 
On the /£ day of flvGu£T~% 1988, personally appeared before me 
TED S. WHITEHOUSE, the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same in my presence. 
f/O 
L** Jv/Xs 
My < *\.: 
T-K, 
My commission expire?: '•* 
\ f'ZS't/"'•': ; 
Tary Public 
Tooele, Utah 84 
g^Cd-^J 
